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Abstract 
 
Older interlocutors are more likely than younger ones to make pragmatic inferences, i.e., 
inferences that go beyond the linguistically encoded meaning of a sentence. Here we ask 
whether pragmatic development is associated with increased activity in brain structures 
associated with inference-making or in those associated with Theory-of-Mind. We employed 
a reading task that presents vignettes in one of two versions, one of which is expected to 
prompt more pragmatic processing.  Both versions present a major premise containing three 
possibilities (e.g. Xavier is considering Thursday, Friday or Saturday for inviting his 
girlfriend out). In the Fully-Deductive (control) condition, the major premise is followed by 
two disjunction-elimination premises through two separate lines (one indicating that Saturday 
is not convenient and another saying that Thursday is not convenient); this is followed by a 
valid conclusion (e.g., “I’ll reserve Friday”). In the Implicated-Premise condition, the first 
disjunction-elimination premise is followed by a second similar one that eliminates the same 
disjunction (e.g. both lines explain why Saturday is not convenient). In this condition, readers 
may pragmatically enrich the conclusion (i.e. "I'll reserve Friday" pragmatically implicates 
that Xavier is also eliminating Thursday from consideration). Reading times in Experiment 1 
showed that processing the speaker’s conclusion in the Implicated-Premise condition 
becomes increasingly more effort-demanding as readers reach adolescence. Experiment 2 
showed that this developmental pattern is related to age-related increases of fMRI activity in 
fronto-parietal regions typically involved in inference-making processes. We found no 
evidence indicating age effects related to Theory of Mind areas.  
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Introduction 
 Pragmatics is concerned with the way a listener goes beyond what a speaker says in 
order to understand what the speaker means (Grice, 1989).  It covers a wide range of readily 
perceptible phenomena, such as metaphor (John is a cheetah to describe a fast runner) and 
irony (that went well to describe a failed meeting) as well as more subtle cases such as 
commands (consider how Pick up the tall glass can indicate to the listener that there is a 
smaller glass in the speaker’s frame of reference). Common to all these cases is the fact that 
the linguistically encoded meaning of the utterance serves as a basis for inferring what the 
speaker intended.   
 Developmental progressions have been crucial to investigating pragmatics. The most 
discussed example in the experimental pragmatic literature focuses on underinformative 
utterances such as Some swans are white, which can be enriched to mean Some but not all 
swans are white (for reviews, see Noveck & Reboul, 2008; Papafragou, 2015). Consider the 
work from Pouscoulous et al. (2007) who showed 9-year-old and adult participants toy 
animals that were placed in and around a set of four boxes; one observable fact was that there 
was a turtle in each of the boxes and nowhere else. When participants were asked to evaluate 
the sentence “Some turtles are in the boxes” as true or false, nine-year-olds were significantly 
more likely than adults to answer true. That is because children appear satisfied with the 
semantic reading of Some (Some and perhaps all) while adults are more likely to 
pragmatically enrich the utterance to Some but not all boxes have a turtle (also see Huang & 
Snedeker, 2009; Katsos et al., 2016). That pragmatic abilities become increasingly evident 
with age can be extended to a range of phenomena, including irony (Fillipova & Astington, 
2010), metaphoric reference (Noveck et al., 2001; Almor et al., 2007) and idioms (Caillies & 
Le Sourn-Bissaoui, 2008).  
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Given the plethora of studies that reveal a progressive emergence of pragmatic 
abilities among children, the question we ask here is a general one: what are the neural 
structures that subserve this development? We consider two possible neural systems in order 
to answer this question. One is derived by assuming that developmental changes arise due to 
generally improving inferential abilities as indicated by neuroimaging studies that point out 
how lateral frontoparietal regions known to support inference-making in adults (Monti et al., 
2007; 2009; Prado et al., 2011; Reverberi et al., 2010; Vendetti & Bunge, 2014) mature from 
middle childhood to adolescence. For example, studies on analogical reasoning have 
demonstrated relatively late age differences in the bilateral rostrolateral prefrontal cortex 
(RLPFC), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and inferior parietal lobule (IPL) (Crone et 
al., 2009; Wendelken et al., 2011, Dumontheil et al., 2010), areas that are thought to support 
relational integration (Dumontheil, 2014) and working-memory demands (Badre & 
D’Esposito, 2007) of inference-making. Age-related increases of activity between middle 
childhood and adolescence have also been found in the RLPFC and DLPFC when participants 
make deductive inferences such as All As are Bs and All Bs are Cs therefore All As are Cs 
(Mathieu et al., 2015). Finally, anatomical studies show structural changes (e.g., an increase 
in white matter density) in the lateral prefrontal cortex until adolescence (Barnea-Goraly et 
al., 2005; Westlye et al., 2010). Overall, neuroimaging studies provide evidence for a 
relatively late functional and anatomical maturation of the lateral frontoparietal regions 
subserving inference-making. The maturation of this inference-making network may be a 
critical factor underlying the development of pragmatic skills in children and adolescents1. 
Another possibility is that emerging pragmatic abilities are linked to a developing 
Theory of Mind (ToM) (Epley et al., 2004b; Dumontheil et al., 2010) because a critical 
                                               
1 Even though we refer here to this set of lateral frontoparietal regions as an “inference-
making network”, it should be emphasized that we do not believe this network is specifically 
involved in inference-making. Rather, the network is more likely involved in domain-general 
processes involved in inference-making. 
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feature of understanding a speaker’s intended meaning is the attribution of mental states to 
others. Although ToM-related skills, such as perspective taking (understanding other’s 
objectives and preferences) and the evaluation of false beliefs (i.e. distinguishing between 
what someone believes and reality), appear to develop relatively early in children (Wellman et 
al., 2001; Baillergeon et al., 2010; Southgate et al., 2007), there are also studies suggesting 
that ToM continues to develop well into adolescence (Dumontheil et al., 2010). For example, 
Dumontheil et al (2010) showed a late developmental improvement in the ability to take into 
account a speaker’s perspective in an online communication game (Keysar et al., 2000; 2003). 
This late development is also consistent with two neuroimaging studies indicating that several 
of the brain regions thought to be involved in ToM are not mature until late childhood (Mills 
et al., 2014; Saxe et al., 2009). For example, Saxe et al. (2009) found functional changes 
between 6 and 11 years of age in the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), a core region supporting 
ToM (Van Overwalle, 2009). Additionally, Mills et al (2014) showed an increase in gray 
matter volume among children between 7 and 10 years of age in the medial prefrontal cortex 
(mPFC), posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), and TPJ, three core regions of ToM (Van 
Overwalle, 2009). As far as pragmatic text comprehension tasks go, it has been demonstrated 
how brain regions associated with Theory of Mind are central to irony understanding in adults 
(Spotorno et al., 2012); given that the development of irony has been documented, it would 
make sense to suppose that children's weaknesses with respect to irony are due to a lack of 
maturity of ToM.  It is thus very reasonable to hypothesize that the occurrence of pragmatic 
competence with age points specifically to maturing ToM regions. 
 Here we aim to test between these two hypotheses by identifying the brain regions 
supporting the development of pragmatic inference-making in children and adolescents. We 
adopted a text-comprehension task that our group has used recently with adults for the neural 
investigation of pragmatic inference-making (Prado et al., 2015). This paradigm presents a 
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series of stories that include an utterance stated by a story character (1f below) that could be 
interpreted in one of two ways as a function of a small change in the preceding context. The 
first sort of interpretation is referred to as Fully-Deductive because the nature of a character's 
remark is, in effect, a conclusion drawn from two successive disjunction-elimination 
inferences, as exemplified in lines (1c) through (1e), that reduce three possibilities to one: 
 
 (1)  (a) Xavier wants to surprise Claire by inviting her to a restaurant. 
(b) He hesitates between these three days of the week: 
(c) Thursday, Friday or Saturday. 
(d) Claire cannot go on Saturday because she has a theatre course. 
(e) Further, Thursday would not work because he is having dinner with his parents. 
(f) He says: “I’ll invite her for Friday.” 
(g) He hopes she will be available that day. 
 
As this story (translated from French) exemplifies, it begins with an introduction setting up a 
context (in lines 1a and 1b) before presenting a disjunctive statement in which three 
possibilities are mentioned (in 1c). Two of these possibilities are then eliminated by the 
speaker (in 1d and 1e) such that its conclusion (in 1f), which logically follows, serves as a 
kind of verification. 
The other sort of interpretation is referred to as an Implicated-Premise interpretation. 
There, the story sets up the context in such a way that the line in (1f) is not conclusive; that is, 
only one possibility of three is eliminated. To arrive at this sort of interpretation, consider the 
above story in (1), but replace the word “Thursday” with “Saturday” in line (1e) so that it now 
reads as: 
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(1)  (e’) Further, Saturday would not work because he is having dinner with his parents. 
 
In other words, Implicated-Premise stories provide two justifications for eliminating just one 
possibility before presenting the story-character's utterance. Now, Xavier’s conclusion in (1f) 
-- that Friday is a good day for the invitation -- still makes sense, but can be understood in one 
of two ways: A participant could process (1f) without a deep reading, i.e. by simply accepting 
the speaker’s utterance without giving further thought to the speaker’s reasoning. In this way, 
the linguistically encoded reading is in effect good enough for processing its meaning. The 
other way to process (1f) is to note that the conclusion puts the reader in a position to infer 
that Xavier is eliminating Thursday, or must have a reason to eliminate Thursday, even 
though he never said so explicitly. This is a pragmatic inference on the part of the reader, 
whose effort to understand the utterance is part of an attempt to access the speaker’s intention. 
Note that this is not an obligatory inference on a par with a deductive one. Our prior study 
(Prado et al, 2015) showed that adults take longer to read the critical line (1f) when it is a 
potential source for an Implicated premise (in the context of a line like [1e’]) than they do 
when it is part of a Fully-Deductive conclusion (in the context of a line like [1e]). 
 In turning to our current developmental study, the goal is twofold. First, in line with 
other developmental pragmatic phenomena, we determine whether the reading times of 
critical utterances (like those in line [1f]) in the Implicated-Premise versions will become 
progressively more distinctive from those in the Fully-Deductive versions as participants get 
older; in other words, lines like (1f) in the Implicated-Premise condition will more likely be 
read as an unremarkable assertion (i.e. without pragmatic enrichment) among younger 
children and as a source of further pragmatic enrichment among older children (and 
adolescents). In Experiment 1, we first establish this anticipated result through a behavioral 
experiment in which children (ages 8 to 15) and adults read Fully-Deductive and Implicated-
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Premise stories while we track the latencies of the critical utterances in the sixth line of each 
story. In our critical follow-up experiment, we use the same paradigm and fMRI in children 
from 8 to 15 while investigating age-related changes of activity in brain regions supporting 
general inference-making (the RLPFC, DLPFC and IPL) and those supporting ToM (the 
bilateral TPJ, the mPFC and the PC).   
Experiment 1 
Material and Methods 
Participants 
Sixty-one healthy adults (age range: 21-45 years) and 91 typically developing children 
participated in the experiment. There were 19 third-graders (age range: 8-9 years), 30 fifth-
graders (age range: 10-11 years), 20 seventh-graders (age range: 12-13 years), and 22 ninth-
graders (age range: 14-15 years). All participants were native French speakers. Nineteen 
participants were excluded from further analyses because of performance below or equal to 
50% on the comprehension questions. An additional participant was excluded because of very 
slow (>10s) or very fast (<1s) reading times on 5 out of 12 of the critical sentences. The final 
dataset included 15 third-graders, 25 fifth-graders, 18 seventh-graders, 18 ninth-graders, and 
56 adults. 
Materials 
Participants were presented with two sorts of short stories containing a disjunction-
elimination argument similar to the scenarios in (1) as described in the Introduction (see 
Table 1). All stories were composed of 7 sentences each, with a mean length of 376 
characters per sentence (standard deviation [sd]=28.5), and had the same structure: Sentence 
(a) introduced the context, sentence (b) introduced the disjunctive argument, and sentences (c) 
through (e) represented the main premises of the argument. Specifically, sentence (b) always 
pointed out that there were three possibilities that could account for an event (e.g., going out 
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on one of three days of the week). Sentence (c) enumerated these possibilities (e.g., 
“Thursday, Friday or Saturday”) and sentence (d) ruled out one of these possibilities (e.g., 
“not on Saturday”). The key manipulation was in sentence (e). In half of the stories (i.e., 
Fully-Deductive stories), sentence (e) ruled out a second possibility out of the three (e.g., “not 
on Thursday”). In the other half of the stories (i.e., Implicated-Premise stories), sentence (e) 
gave another reason for eliminating the possibility that had been already ruled out in sentence 
(d) (i.e., confirming “not on Saturday”). Sentence (f) presented the story character’s critical 
remark (e.g., “it will be on Friday”). Therefore, in Fully-Deductive stories, the utterance 
necessarily follows from the premises and is confirmatory. In Implicated-Premise stories, 
participants read the protagonist’s conclusion and are in a position to draw a further inference 
that would justify the conclusion. Sentence (g) was the wrap-up sentence. In general, only one 
word differed between Fully-Deductive and Implicated-Premise stories (in sentence (e)). 
Seventeen different story frameworks were created. Each framework involved a different 
situation and different characters. Each participant read either the Fully-Deductive or the 
Implicated-Premise version of a framework.  
Twelve stories were randomly chosen for each participant and these were evenly 
divided between Fully-Deductive and Implicated-Premise stories. Two-thirds of Fully-
Deductive and Implicated-Premise stories were followed by a yes/no comprehension question 
(e.g., “In your opinion, does Xavier plan to invite his girlfriend?”, see Table 1). This question 
was designed to verify that participants were paying attention to the content in the stories. 
One-third of Fully-Deductive and Implicated-Premise stories were followed by a question that 
required participants to judge whether the conclusion made by the character was justified 
(e.g., “In your opinion, is Xavier justified to think that he should invite Claire on Friday?”, see 
Table 1). The justification question provides an off-line measure to determine whether 
participants detect the difference between the two types of story. 
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Experimental procedures 
The experiment was programmed with MATLAB while using the Psychophysics 
Toolbox (Brainard, 1997). Stories were presented line by line on a computer screen. 
Participants were instructed to read at their own pace and to press the space bar to read the 
next sentence. Each story started with a red fixation cross, which appeared on the left side of 
the screen. The cross remained red for 3 seconds, orange for 1 second and green for 1 second. 
Each line of the story was then displayed in a left-justified manner half-way up the screen. 
Each sentence remained on the screen until the participant pressed a key, or after 12 seconds 
if no key was pressed. A black screen was displayed for a half-second between each sentence. 
After the disappearance of the last line, a white fixation cross appeared on the left of the 
screen for 2 seconds. The question then appeared at the center of the screen. Participants had a 
12 second window to answer the question. The trial ended with the participant’s response or 
after the allotted time if no response was provided. Each story was directly followed by a 
period of visual fixation (ranging from 2 to 4 seconds). All stories were presented in a 
randomized order.  
Analyses 
Statistical analyses were conducted using the lme4 package implemented in R (Bates, 
Maechler & Bolker, 2012). Log-transformed reading times were analyzed using a linear 
mixed model, while responses to comprehension and justification questions were analyzed 
using logistic mixed models. All full models included in their fixed effects an intercept, a 
main effect of Story version (i.e., Fully-Deductive versus Implicated-Premise), a main effect 
of Age, and an interaction between Story version and Age. The categorical factor Story 
version was deviation coded as -0.5 for Fully-Deductive stories and 0.5 for Implicated-
Premise stories. Age was entered as a continuous variable by coding third-graders, fifth-
graders, seventh-graders, ninth-graders and adults as 8.5, 10.5, 12.5, 14.5 and 25 years 
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(respectively)2. The continuous variable Age was then mean-centered. All models also had 
maximal random effects structure, with by-subject random intercept and slope for Story 
version, as well as by-story random intercepts and slopes for Story version, Age, and their 
interaction. Main effects and interactions were tested using likelihood ratio tests between 
mixed effect models differing only in the presence or absence of fixed effects of interest. The 
dataset and R scripts are available at Mendeley Data: http://dx.doi.org/10.17632/fd7t5h3grb.2. 
 
Results and discussion 
The linear mixed model with reading time of the conclusion (i.e., sentence (f)) as 
dependent variable revealed a significant main effect of Age (β=-0.02, SE=0.004, 
χ2(1)=21.18, p< 0.001), showing that overall reading time of the conclusion decreased with 
age. The main effect of Story version was significant (β=0.06, SE=0.03, χ2(1)=3.93, p=0.047). 
More importantly, there was a significant interaction between Age and Story version 
(β=0.012, SE=0.005, χ2(1)=5.96, p=0.015). That is, the difference in reading time between 
conclusions of Fully-Deductive and Implicated-Premise stories increased with age (see Fig. 
1A). We then tested for the presence of an effect of Story version in each age group 
separately. Follow-up linear mixed models with the fixed effect Story version (as well as by-
subject and by-story random intercepts and slopes for Story version) revealed a significant 
main effect of Story version (β=0.14, SE=0.03, χ2(1)=13.82, p< 0.001) for adult participants, 
but not for any other age groups (all χ2(1)s < 2.68, all ps> 0.10). In other words, only adults 
read conclusions of Implicated-Premise stories significantly slower than conclusions of Fully-
Deductive stories.  
 Overall mean accuracy for comprehension questions was 74% for 3rd graders, 79% for 
5th graders, 78% for 7th graders, 88% for 9th graders and 86% for adults. The logistic mixed 
                                               
2 Note that for illustration purpose descriptive analyses are presented by age-group in all figures. 
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model with accuracy for comprehension questions as dependent variable revealed a 
significant main effect of Age (β=0.040, SE=0.013, χ2(1)=9.79, p=0.002), indicating that 
overall accuracy increased with age. Neither the main effect of Story version (β=-0.23, 
SE=0.21, χ2(1)=1.74, p=0.19) nor the interaction between Age and Story version (β=-0.008, 
SE=0.026, χ2(1)=0.10, p=0.75) were significant. 
Responses to justification questions were then analyzed to determine whether 
participants’ agreement with the conclusion depended upon Story version and Age (see Fig. 
1B). The logistic mixed model with accuracy for justification questions as dependent variable 
revealed significant main effects of Age (β=-0.05, SE=0.02, χ2(1)=5.43, p=0.02) and Story 
version (β=-1.45, SE=0.34, χ2(1)=13.50, p <0.001). That is, acceptance rates of justification 
questions decreased with age and were overall lower for Implicit-premise than Fully-
deductive stories. Critically, the interaction between Age and Story version was also 
significant (β=-0.17, SE=0.04, χ2(1)=16.13, p <0.001). That is, there was a greater age-related 
decrease in acceptance rates of justification questions for Implicit-premise than Fully-
deductive stories. Follow-up logistic mixed models with the fixed effect Story version (as well 
as by-subject and by-story random intercepts and slopes for Story version) revealed that the 
main effect of Story version was significant in adults (β=-3.07, SE=0.67, χ2(1)=23.86, p< 
0.001) and in ninth-graders (β=-2.73, SE=1.13, χ2(1)=11.86, p <0.001) 3, but not in the other 
groups (all χ2(1)s <0.93, all ps> 0.33). Therefore, acceptance rates of justification questions 
were lower for Implicated-Premise than Fully-Deductive stories in ninth-graders and adults. 
The adults’ data here are consistent with those from our previous study (Prado et al. 
2015), where we found longer reading times for the conclusions in Implicated-Premise stories 
as well as lower acceptance rates for the justification questions when compared to the Fully-
Deductive stories. Here we extend these results by reporting a developmental divergence in a) 
                                               
3 For 9th graders, the random slope structure was simplified by removing the by-story random slope for 
Story version because the full model did not converge.  
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conclusion-reading times that become significant among adults and in; b) accepting the 
justification question that begins to emerge at around 9th grade. Importantly, this 
developmental trend emerged without negatively affecting the participants’ overall 
comprehension of stories (which increased with age).  
We can think of at least 3 possible explanations for this developmental trend, which 
we now consider one at a time. First, the effect might result from the detection of an infelicity 
earlier in the story. That is, older participants (as compared to younger ones) may find the 5th 
sentence (sentence (e)) of Implicated-Premise stories infelicitous, because it might repeat 
some information that was already mentioned in the 4th sentence. This might have 
downstream consequences on reading times of the conclusion and explain why there is 
increasing divergence between Implicated-Premise conclusion-reading times and Fully-
Deductive conclusion reading-times with age. It is important to note that all of our stories 
were written with the utmost care so as to minimize such infelicity in sentence (e). That is, the 
information that was repeated in sentence (e) was always accompanied by further 
justification. For example, consider these consecutive statements (lines (c) through (e), 
translated from French) from our “what night to go out story”, “what form of transportation 
shall he use story” and the “what language are they speaking story”: 
 
(2)  (c) Thursday, Friday or Saturday. 
(d) Claire cannot (go out) on Saturday because she has a theatre course. 
(e) Besides, Saturday is not convenient because she is going out with her parents. 
 
(3)  (c) By train, by motorcycle, or by car. 
(d) His motorcycle isn’t working because it broke down yesterday.  
(e) Besides, he never uses his motorcycle to go on vacation. 
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(4)  (c) Italian, Portuguese, or Spanish. 
 (d) It’s not Portuguese because my Mom speaks Portuguese, Camille declares.  
 (e) She adds after: “I am sure it is not Portuguese.” 
 
As one can see, each story presents participants with two reasons to eliminate one option. This 
arguably occurs in everyday life and is not infelicitous per se. Nonetheless, we acknowledge 
that this repetition might contribute to the difference observed between Implicated-Premise 
and Fully-Deductive stories. 
A second explanation for the observed effect is that, in a way similar to cloze 
probability effects (Kutas & Hillyard, 1984; Coulson & Van Petten, 2002), premises in Fully-
Deductive stories may allow sophisticated readers to know which alternative is going to be 
mentioned in the conclusion. In contrast, premises in Implicated-Premise stories may not 
allow such a prediction. In other words, the most sophisticated readers may be surprised when 
reading the conclusion in the Implicated-premise condition because they are not expecting it. 
We acknowledge that surprise may come into play with age and that it becomes part of the 
process in arriving at an alternative reading. Note that this explanation would put the effect 
squarely in the realm of pragmatics and not as an example of sentence-level processing. To 
put it in Gricean terms (1989), one could argue that our more sophisticated participants 
recognize that a maxim (of Relevance) has been violated and that this generates further 
implicatures in order to maintain the Cooperative Principle. Regardless, a participant would 
be put in the position to consider what happened to the remaining possibility. The question is 
whether readers are more likely to pursue that consideration with age. 
A third explanation, which we proposed in our previous adult study (Prado et al. 
2015), is that conclusions in Implicated-Premise stories are more likely than those in the 
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Fully-Deductive condition to encourage further pragmatic inference-making and particularly 
among more sophisticated participants. That is, sophisticated readers may make an effort to 
understand the utterance as part of an attempt to access the speaker’s intention. The present 
experiment is therefore consistent with the idea that pragmatic inference-making emerges 
over the course of development (Huang & Snedeker, 2009; Katsos et al., 2016; Pouscoulous 
et al., 2007). If correct, this explanation would raise an intriguing question: which abilities 
would be responsible for the emergence of such pragmatic inference-making in this task? On 
the one hand, it may be attributed to the development of inference-making mechanisms over 
the course of childhood and adolescence. On the other hand, increasingly sophisticated 
pragmatic abilities may depend upon a more acute ability to attribute mental states to others 
(i.e., ToM). The goal of Experiment 2 was to test between these hypotheses using fMRI. 
 
Experiment 2 
The goal of Experiment 2 was to determine the structural source that accounts for the 
emerging developmental effect. We employed the paradigm from Experiment 1 as we used 
fMRI to measure developmental changes among children between the ages of 8 and 15. We 
also relied on the extant literature to draw conclusions about the role that different brain 
networks (i.e., inference-making versus ToM) may play in this reading task.  
 
Material and Methods 
Participants 
Twenty-eight typically developing children participated in this fMRI experiment. All 
children included in the fMRI study (1) were native French speakers, (2) had no MRI counter-
indications, (3) had no history of neurological and psychiatric disorder, (4) had no diagnosis 
of mental retardation or high intellectual potential and a full-scale IQ between 70 and 130 as 
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measured by the NEMI-2 (Nouvelle Echelle Metrique de l’Intelligence) (Cognet, 2006), (5) 
had no diagnosis of autism and a score lower than 32 on the Autism Quotient test (Baron-
Cohen et al, 2001), and (6) had no diagnosis of dyslexia and a reading score higher than a 
standardized score of 70 on the Alouette test [Lefavrais, 1967]). Overall, ten participants were 
excluded from further analysis for one of the following reasons: performance below or close 
to 50% on the comprehension questions (n=3), excessive head motion during the imaging 
session (n=2), poor brain coverage (n=1), technical issues during image acquisition (n=3), or 
an excessive delay between the imaging session and the completion of the standardized tests 
(n=1). Thus, the analyses included 18 subjects (9 females), aged from 8.35 to 14.71 
(mean=11.61, sd=1.89).  
Parents gave their written informed consent and children gave their assent to 
participate in the experiment. Families were paid 80 euros for their participation. The 
experiment was approved by the local ethics committee (CPP Lyon Sud-Est II).  
Materials 
Fully-Deductive and Implicated-Premise stories were similar to those used in 
Experiment 1 (see Table 1). However, to maximize signal-to-noise ratio for the fMRI data, 6 
additional stories were presented to participants for each story version. That is, there were 24 
stories with a disjunctive argument in this experiment (12 Fully-Deductive and 12 Implicated-
Premise stories). Following Prado et al. (2015), 12 filler stories were also included to help 
disguise the goal of the experiment in the scanner (see Table 1). Filler stories did not contain 
disjunctive arguments.  
Experimental procedures 
The task and stimulus timing were identical to those in Experiment 1. However, in 
addition to being read on the screen, each line was spoken over headphones too. Periods of 
visual fixation between stories constituted the baseline. The fMRI session was split into 6 runs 
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that contained 6 stories each (2 Fully-Deductive stories, 2 Implicated-Premise stories, and 2 
filler stories). Stories were presented in a pseudo-randomized order, so that two stories of the 
same type were not following each other within a run. Behavioral responses during scanning 
were recorded using MR-compatible keypads placed below each hand. Stimuli were 
generated using Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, CA) and displayed 
on a computer screen that was viewed by the participants through a mirror attached to the 
head coil. 
Several days before the fMRI session, participants were invited to the lab to complete 
the psychometric tests (i.e., IQ, AQ and Alouette reading test) and to practice the task in a 
mock fMRI scanner. During that practice session, children were presented with 12 filler 
stories (whose content differed from the filler stories used in the main experiment). 
Imaging acquisition  
Functional and anatomical images were acquired with a Philips 3T Achieva scanner 
(Philips Medical systems, Best, Netherlands). A high-resolution anatomical scan was 
collected for each participant (Field of view=240x240 mm, 512x512 matrix, TR=1278 ms, 
TE=3.047 ms, flip angle=8°, slice thickness=0.9 mm, number of slices=188). Functional 
sequences were collected with a gradient-echo, echo-planar sequence (TR=2200 ms, TE=30 
ms, flip angle=90°). Twenty-six axial slices were acquired per volume (slice thickness=3.5 
mm, Field of view=220 mm, 128x128 matrix).  
fMRI preprocessing 
Images were analyzed with SPM8 (Statistical Parametric Map 8, Welcome 
Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK). The first 6 volumes of each run were not 
acquired to allow for T1 equilibration effects. Functional images were corrected for slice 
acquisition delays and realigned to the first image of the first run to correct for head 
movements. Volumes with excessive head motion were further identified using the ArtRepair 
17 
 
software (Mazaika et al., 2009). Specifically, following the criteria used in our previous 
studies (Demir et al, 2014; 2015; 2016; Mathieu et al, 2017), volumes showing rapid scan-to-
scan movement greater than 1.5 mm were substituted by the interpolation of the 2 nearest 
non-repaired volumes. Runs with more than 10% of repaired volumes were excluded from the 
analysis (based on this cut-off, one run was discarded for 4 participants and 2 runs were 
discarded for 2 participants). Realigned images were spatially smoothed with a Gaussian filter 
prior application of the ArtRepair algorithms. Because voxels were anisotropic, this filter was 
also anisotropic (4 × 4 × 8 mm full-width at half maximum). Finally, in line with our previous 
studies on children within the same age range (Prado et al, 2014; Schwartz et al, 2017), all 
individual brains were normalized into the standard adult MNI space.  
 Statistical analyses of fMRI data were performed according to the GLM. Following 
Prado et al. (2015), brain activity elicited by the conclusion of each story was modeled by a 
block encompassing the last two sentences (i.e., sentences (f) and (g)). The onset of this block 
was time-locked to the beginning of sentence (f) and the offset was time-locked to the 
beginning of the question. Sentences (a) to (e) were modeled as events of no interest with an 
onset time-locked to the beginning of sentence (a) and an offset time-locked to the beginning 
of sentence (f). The question was modeled as an event of no interest. For each subject and for 
each run, this model was applied to the three types of stories (Fully-Deductive, Implicated-
Premise and filler stories). Time series were high-pass filtered (1/128 Hertz) and serial 
correlations were corrected for first-order (AR1) autocorrelations. 
fMRI analyses 
 Following Prado et al. (2015), fMRI data were analyzed using a Region of Interest 
(ROI) approach. Specifically, we aimed to measure activity in brain networks involved in 
inference-making and ToM. Several studies have identified the RLPFC, DLPFC and IPL as 
critical regions for inference-making in children and adults (Crone et al, 2009; Wendelken et 
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al, 2011; Mathieu et al, 2015; Vendetti & Bunge, 2014). Therefore, we defined bilateral ROIs 
in each of these regions based on coordinates from our previous study on adult participants 
that employed the same task (Prado et al., 2015). To define ROIs involved in ToM, we turned 
to a meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies on ToM (Van Owervalle, 2009). ToM ROIs were 
located in the bilateral TPJ, the mPFC and the PC (Table 2). In line with Prado et al. (2015), 
all ROIs were 6-mm radius spheres and were defined using the SPM toolbox Marsbar. The 
fMRI signal (beta weight) was averaged for each subject and story version (Fully-Deductive 
and Implicated-Premise) across all voxels within a given ROI. Beta weights from the bilateral 
RLPFC, bilateral DLPFC and bilateral IPL were then averaged to reflect activity in the 
inference-making network (see Fig. 2). Similarly, beta weights from the bilateral TPJ, mPFC 
and PC were averaged to reflect activity in the ToM network.  
It is important to acknowledge that the sample size in Experiment 2 (n=18) was 
smaller than in Experiment 1 (n=132). Because there is no previous fMRI study on the 
development of pragmatic abilities in children, effect size estimates were not available to 
inform sample size. This raises the possibility that Experiment 2 may be underpowered and 
that the chance of discovering true effects is relatively low (Button et al., 2013). Therefore, 
rather than using frequentist statistics as in Experiment 1, we turned to Bayesian analyses to 
analyze the experiment and assess its sensitivity (Morey et al., 2016; Lee & Wagenmakers, 
2013). Specifically, we applied the Sequential Bayes Factors (SBF) procedure to estimate the 
strength of evidence for age-related changes of activity (H1) versus no age-related changes of 
activity (H0) as a function of increased sample size, both in the inference-making and the 
ToM network (Rouder, 2014; Schönbrodt et al, 2017). In the SBF procedure, a Bayes factor 
(i.e., BF10) is repeatedly calculated as sample size increases, until there is enough evidence for 
either H1 or H0. Because BF10 will always converge either towards 0 (if H0 is true) or 
towards infinity (if H1 is true), data collection may be stopped when enough evidence is 
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gathered. As suggested by Jeffreys (1939), a BF10 > 3 indicates “substantial evidence” for H1 
versus H0 (i.e., “substantial” indicating evidence starting to be worth taking note of; Lee and 
Wagenmakers, 2013). Conversely, a BF10< 1/3 indicates substantial evidence for H0 versus 
H1. Therefore, 3< BF10< 1/3 indicates data sensitivity for distinguishing between H1 and H0 
and has been used as a stopping rule for data collection in previous studies (e.g., Martin et al., 
2016). All analyses were performed with JASP (https://jasp-stats.org). Beta maps for all 
participants and conditions are available at NeuroVault, along with ROI masks: 
https://neurovault.org/collections/3040/. Associated behavioral data are available at Mendeley 
Data: http://dx.doi.org/10.17632/fd7t5h3grb.2. The Matlab scripts used to analyze fMRI data 
are available upon request. 
 
Results and discussion 
fMRI data 
We first focused on conclusions of Implicated-Premise stories and used Bayesian 
Pearson correlations to estimate the strength of evidence for age-related change (H1) versus 
no age-related change (H0) of activity in those stories. In the inference-making network, there 
was substantial evidence for H1 versus H0 (BF10 = 5.40), with activity being positively 
correlated with age (r = 0.58) (see Fig. 3A, left). The SBF procedure indicated that substantial 
level of evidence was obtained with about 12 participants (see Fig. 3A, right). In the ToM 
network, however, there was substantial evidence for H0 versus H1 (r = -0.10, BF10 = 0.31) 
(see Fig. 3B, left). This level of evidence was obtained with about 13 participants (see Fig. 
3B, right). Therefore, there was evidence for a positive relationship between age and activity 
associated with conclusions of Implicated-Premise stories in the inference-making network, 
but not in the ToM network. 
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To evaluate how specific these relationships were to Implicated-Premise stories, we 
then used Bayesian Pearson correlations to estimate the strength of evidence for H1 versus H0 
in Fully-Deductive stories. For conclusions of Fully-Deductive stories, we found anecdotal 
evidence for H0 versus H1 in the inference-making network (r = 0.29, BF10 = 0.55) (see Fig. 
4A), and substantial evidence for H0 versus H1 in the ToM network (r = 0.03, BF10 = 0.29) 
(see Fig. 4B, left). The SBF procedure indicated that substantial evidence for H0 versus H1 
was obtained with about 15 participants in the ToM network (see Fig. 4B, right). Therefore, 
in the inference-making and ToM networks, there was anecdotal to substantial evidence for a 
lack of relationship between age and activity associated with conclusions of Fully-Deductive 
stories. 
Change of brain activity with age was then directly compared between story versions 
and networks using a Bayesian ANOVA with default prior scales. The ANOVA included the 
within-subject factors Story version (Fully-Deductive versus Implicated-Premise) and 
Network (inference-making versus ToM), as well as the between-subject factor Age. In a 
Bayesian ANOVA, different models that include versus do not include each factor and 
interaction are created4. A BF10 is then calculated for each model (i.e., reflecting the evidence 
in favor of that model versus the null model) and Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) is used 
to estimate evidence in favor of main effects and interactions (Hoeting et al., 1999). Critically, 
this analysis revealed substantial evidence for the Story version × Network × Age interaction 
(BF10 = 5). That is, there was substantial evidence for a stronger relationship between activity 
for Implicated-Premise conclusions and age in the inference-making than in the ToM network 
(correlation between age and difference in activity between inference-making and ToM 
network for Implicated-Premise conclusions: r = 0.59, BF10 = 6.20). In contrast, there was 
anecdotal evidence for an equal relationship between activity for Fully-Deductive conclusions 
                                               
4 Interactions were only included when the component main effects were present (Rouder et al, 2017). 
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and age in the inference-making and in the ToM network (correlation between age and 
difference in activity between inference-making and ToM network for Fully-Deductive 
conclusions: r = 0.27, BF10 = 0.50) (see Fig 5). Evidence for main-effects and other lower-
order interactions is shown on Table 3. For the sake of completeness, frequentist analyses are 
described in the Supporting information. 
 
Behavioral data 
Even though this was not the main goal of Experiment 2, we also analyzed behavioral 
responses in the scanner to evaluate whether patterns were similar to those obtained in 
Experiment 1. First, log-transformed reading times of the conclusion (i.e., sentence (f)) were 
analyzed in a Bayesian ANOVA with default prior scales. The ANOVA included the within-
subject factor Story version (Fully-Deductive versus Implicated-Premise) and the between-
subject factor Age. BMA indicated anecdotal evidence for main effects of Story version (BF10 
= 2.31) and Age (BF10 = 1.31). There was also anecdotal evidence for the Story version×Age 
interaction (BF10 = 1.11). That is, even though a visual examination of conclusion reading 
times as a function of age and story version suggests an age-related increase in the cost of 
reading conclusions of Implicated-Premise stories when compared to Fully-Deductive ones 
(see Fig. 6A), there was only marginal evidence for this pattern with the sample size of 
Experiment 2. Consistent with an increasing body of literature, this might suggest that neural 
measures can be more sensitive than behavioral measures in tracking a developmental 
phenomenon (Gabrieli et al., 2015). Frequentist statistics for reading times of conclusions in 
Experiment 2 are described in the Supporting information. 
Second, responses to justification questions were analyzed using a similar Bayesian 
ANOVA with default prior scales. BMA indicated extreme evidence for a main effect of 
condition (BF10> 100). That is, participants were much less likely to accept conclusions in 
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Implicit-Premise stories than in Fully-Deductive stories (24% versus 81%). There was 
anecdotal evidence for a main effect of Age (BF10 = 0.65) and for a Story version × Age 
interaction (BF10 = 2.06). Unlike in Experiment 1, a visual examination of responses to 
justification questions as a function of age and story version indicates no age-related decrease 
in Implicated-Premise stories (see Fig. 6B). That is, unlike in Experiment 1, most young 
participants responded in an adult-like way to the justification questions of the two main kinds 
of stories. We can see three explanations for this result. One is that young children, who 
choose to devote several hours of their time to standardized tests and fMRI scanning, may be 
more motivated than children carrying out a reading task in school. As a result, they may pay 
more attention to the difference between the two types of stories. Another possible 
explanation is that the presence of filler stories in the fMRI experiment (as well as the greater 
number of trials) allows children to better appreciate the difference between the two main 
conditions. A last explanation is that Experiment 2 presented the lines of text both visually 
and aurally. In any case, an examination of developmental changes in reading times for 
Implicated-Premise conclusions (as compared to Fully-Deductive ones) points to a pattern 
that is largely similar to that observed in Experiment 1. So, while future work could address 
children’s superior performance with the off-line justification questions here, indications are 
that our paradigm is indeed capturing pragmatic inference-making development in the 
scanner.  
 
General Discussion 
In Experiment 1, we found that the reading time of conclusions in the Implicated-
Premise stories (as compared to Fully-Deductive stories) significantly increased with age. 
Given that pragmatic abilities are well known to develop from childhood to adolescence (e.g. 
Huang & Snedeker, 2009; Katsos et al., 2016; Pouscoulous et al., 2007), this effect may be 
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due to the fact that a conclusion in the Implicated-Premise condition can be considered as a 
source for an enriching pragmatic inference. In Experiment 2, we used fMRI to investigate the 
neural bases of this developmental trend in children from 8 to 15. We began with two 
competing hypotheses. One was that the emergence of pragmatic inference-making would be 
linked to areas known for other sorts of inference-making; the other was that the emergence of 
pragmatic inference-making would be linked to the development of ToM structures. We 
found evidence for age-related increases of activity in fronto-parietal regions associated with 
inference-making, but not in regions associated with ToM.  
 
Pragmatic processing of conclusions in Implicated-Premise stories increases with age 
At the behavioral level (Experiment 1), our results indicate that the reading time of 
conclusions in Implicated-Premise stories -- as compared to Fully-Deductive stories -- 
becomes increasingly distinctive between middle childhood and adulthood. This can be seen 
in two ways. First, our oldest participants took significantly longer to read the conclusions in 
Implicated-Premise stories as opposed to the conclusions in Fully-Deductive ones. Second, 
the acceptance rates of justification questions (asking whether the protagonist was justified to 
draw the conclusion) dropped progressively with age and significantly so for the Implicated-
Premise stories when compared to the Fully-Deductive ones. Interestingly, Experiment 1’s 
younger participants’ rates of assenting to the justification questions are comparable across 
the Fully-Deductive and Implicated-Premise stories. The results among the older participants 
are consistent with our previous adult study (Prado et al, 2015). Overall, indications are that, 
with age, reading conclusions in the Implicated-Premise condition requires extra-processing 
as compared to conclusions in the Fully-Deductive condition.  
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Increased pragmatic processing of conclusions in Implicated-Premise stories is associated 
with increased activity in the inference-making network 
We now turn to our main question (what develops with the more demanding pragmatic 
task?) by considering participants’ neural activity associated with processing conclusions in 
Implicated-Premise and Fully-Deductive stories (Experiment 2). Using Bayesian analyses, we 
found substantial evidence for a lack of age-related increase of activity in the ToM network, 
both for conclusions of Implicated-Premise and Fully-Deductive stories. That is, changes of 
activity in the ToM network are unlikely to account for the developmental trend observed in 
Experiment 1. In the inference-making network, however, we found evidence for age-related 
increases of activity that were specific to Implicated-Premise conclusions and to that network. 
That is, these changes were (i) not observed for Fully-Deductive conclusions and (ii) larger in 
the inference-making than in the ToM network. The inference-making network, which 
includes the RLPFC, DLPFC and IPL, has been consistently identified in various studies of 
conditional reasoning (Monti et al., 2007; Noveck et al., 2004), disjunctive reasoning 
(Reverberi et al, 2007), categorical reasoning (Goel et al., 2001; Prado et al., 2013), transitive 
reasoning (Fangmeier et al., 2006; Prado et al., 2008; 2013), matrix reasoning (Crone et al., 
2009) and analogical reasoning (Wendelken et al., 2008). It has been argued that the different 
regions composing this system may be involved in different aspects of inference-making. For 
example, whereas the IPL and the DLPFC might be involved in the representation and 
maintenance of information (e.g., premises) in working memory (Badre & D’Esposito, 2007), 
the RLPFC might support relational integration and play a critical role in integrating premises 
of arguments in order to produce or evaluate conclusions (Bunge et al., 2009; Prado et al, 
2013; Vendetti and Bunge, 2014). Overall, the hypothesized developmental emergence of 
pragmatic inference-making in our task is more likely associated with the maturation of the 
inference-making network than with greater engagement of the ToM network. 
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Relevance of our findings to the literature on the neural bases of pragmatic processing 
 We believe that the current findings speak to recent neuroimaging findings on scalar 
inferences (which, as pointed out earlier, concerns the way an underinformative utterance 
such as Some x are y can be enriched to mean Some but not all x are y), arguably the most 
investigated pragmatic inference in the cognitive sciences. A recent line of neuroimaging 
work (Shetreet et al. 2014a, 2014b; 2014c), which includes a developmental study, presents 
data supporting the claim that the main site responsible for scalar inference-making ought to 
be found in language areas (viz. left Inferior Frontal Gyrus); this claim stems from a 
theoretical approach that treats scalar inferences as linguistic in nature (Chierchia et al., 
2004). Yet, this region is not part of the inference-making network in which we found age-
related increases of activity in our task. Given the current state of the literature on inference-
making (which covers logical, linguistic, and pragmatic inference), we briefly consider two 
reasons to question the role of linguistic mechanisms from the left Inferior Frontal Gyrus in 
pragmatic inference-making. First, the part of the left IFG that was found activated in Shetreet 
et al. in 2014 (i.e., Brodmann Area [BA] 47) does not subserve linguistic functioning 
exclusively. For example, Monti et al. (2009) showed – through the juxtaposition of two very 
similar tasks that aimed to determine the neural underpinnings of logical inference-making 
and of linguistic inference-making – that BA47 is implicated in both linguistic inferencing 
and logical inferencing. This suggests that activity in BA47 does not necessarily point to 
linguistic computations only. Second, it is interesting to note that Shetreet et al.’s most 
discerning isolating case (one which compares an underinformative Some statement to their 
task’s two other Some statements) points to BA10, i.e., a region of the RLPFC that is part of 
the inference-making network in the present task. Thus, a stronger claim for the literature, 
which encompasses Shetreet et al.’s data, is arguably that regions of the inference-making 
26 
 
network as defined here – including the RLPFC – plays a key role in pragmatic inference-
making.   
 
Limitations 
 We consider two potential limitations to our work. First, we did not find any evidence 
for a developmental increase of activity associated with Implicated-Premise stories in the 
ToM network. Based on that observation and on evidence that activity increased in the 
inference-making network, we concluded that the development of pragmatic inference-
making in our task was more likely due to the maturation of the inference-making than the 
ToM network. However, it is important to note that all children in the present study were 
older than 8. Thus, it remains possible that developmental changes of activity in ToM regions 
may underlie the development of pragmatic processing in younger children. In other words, 
although the present study suggests that the development of ToM mechanisms is unlikely to 
account for the development of pragmatic inference-making from 8 to 14, future research 
might investigate to what extent it might for younger children. 
Second, performing cross-sectional fMRI experiments is challenging and the final 
sample size of Experiment 2 (n=18) is limited, especially when compared to that of 
Experiment 1 (n=132). It is therefore possible that Experiment 2 is not sensitive enough to 
detect true effects. To assess the sensitivity of our fMRI analyses, Experiment 2 was analyzed 
using Bayesian rather than frequentist statistics (Morey et al., 2016; Lee & Wagenmakers, 
2013). That is, we reported the strength of evidence for H1 (there is an age-related change of 
activity) versus H0 (there is no age-related change of activity) in all analyses, thereby 
allowing readers to quantify evidence for the effects observed. We also used the Sequential 
Bayes Factors (SBF) procedure to indicate the number of participants required to reach 
substantial evidence for H1 versus H0 (and vice versa) (Rouder, 2014; Schönbrodt et al, 
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2017). Although we found substantial evidence for most of the critical effects with our sample 
size), we acknowledge that this sample size remains small. Thus, these fMRI results should be 
seen as providing the groundwork for future studies that might investigate the development of 
pragmatic inference-making in fMRI studies with larger sample sizes. 
 
Conclusion 
In sum, we investigated the neural development of pragmatic inference-making in 
natural discourse. While using ecologically valid texts that reflect natural discourse, our 
behavioral study is in keeping with the idea that pragmatic inferencing may increase with age 
through adolescence. At the neural level, we did not find evidence for age-related changes of 
activity in the ToM network. Instead, we found evidence indicating that activity in the 
inference-making network significantly increased from childhood through adolescence. Thus, 
the hypothesized development of pragmatic inference-making in our task is more likely 
supported by a functional maturation of inference-making brain structures rather than a 
maturation of ToM areas.  
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Figure legends 
Figure 1 
Results from Experiment 1. (A) Mean reading time of the conclusion as a function of age 
group and story version. (B) Mean acceptance rate for the justification question as a function 
of age group and story version. 
 
Figure 2 
Location of ROIs constituting the inference-making and the ToM networks on coronal slices 
of an MRI-normalized brain. 
 
Figure 3 
Age-related changes in activity associated with conclusions of Implicated-Premise stories. (A) 
Correlation between activity and age (left) and associated Bayes factor as a function of 
increased sample size (i.e., Sequential Bayes Factors analysis) (right). (B) Correlation 
between activity and age (left) and associated Bayes factor as a function of increased sample 
size (right) in the ToM network. 
 
Figure 4 
Age-related changes in activity associated with conclusions of Fully-Deductive stories. (A) 
Correlation between activity and age (left) and associated Bayes factor as a function of 
increased sample size (i.e., Sequential Bayes Factors analysis) (right). (B) Correlation 
between activity and age (left) and associated Bayes factor as a function of increased sample 
size (right) in the ToM network. 
 
Figure 5 
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Correlations between age and difference in activity between inference-making and ToM 
networks for Implicated-Premise and Fully-Deductive conclusions. 
 
Figure 6 
Behavioral results from Experiment 2. (A) Mean reading time of the conclusion as a function 
of age and story version. (B) Mean acceptance rate for the justification question as a function 
of age and story version. 
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Table 1. Two examples of disjunctive stories and a filler story used in the experiments 
(translated from French). 
 
 
 
Notes. Filler stories were presented only in Experiment 2 and were always followed by a comprehension 
question. Otherwise, two thirds of the Fully-Deductive and Implicated-Premise stories were followed by a 
comprehension question and one third by a justification question (see text). 
  
Disjunctive story 1 a. Xavier wants to surprise Claire by inviting her to a restaurant. 
 b. He hesitates between these three days of the week: 
 c. Thursday, Friday or Saturday. 
 d. Claire cannot go on Saturday because she has a theatre course. 
Fully-Deductive cond: e. Moreover, Thursday would not work because he is having dinner with his parents. 
Implicated-Premise cond: e’. Moreover, Saturday would not work because he is having dinner with his 
parents. 
 f. He says: “I’ll invite her for Friday.” 
 g. He hopes she will be available that day. 
Comprehension question: In your opinion, does Xavier plan to invite his girlfriend? 
Justification question: In your opinion, is Xavier justified to think that he should invite Claire on Friday? 
Disjunctive story 2 a. Michael wants to start playing a musical instrument. 
 b. He hesitates between these three instruments: 
 c. The drums, the piano and the guitar. 
 d. His dad does not want him to play (take classes in) drums because it is too noisy. 
Fully-Deductive cond: e. Further, he cannot play (take classes in) piano because it is way too expensive. 
Implicated-Premise cond: e’. Further, he cannot play (take classes in) drums because it is way too expensive. 
 f. He says: “I will start taking (classes on) the guitar.” 
 g. He hopes he will improve quickly. 
Comprehension question: In your opinion, does Michael want to play a music instrument? 
Justification question: In your opinion, is Michael justified to think that he has to start playing the guitar? 
Filler story a. Jennifer just bought a new camera. 
 b. She wants to unpack it immediately. 
 c. It would be easier with a sharp knife. 
 d. She goes to the kitchen to pick up a sharp knife. 
 e. After a few minutes, she retrieves the camera from the package. 
 f. She decides to read the instructions before using it. 
 g. She is very excited to start taking pictures. 
Comprehension question: In your opinion, is Jennifer happy with what she bought? 
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Table 2. MNI Coordinates of ROIs  from the inference-making and ToM networks 
 
Anatomical 
Location 
∼BA 
 
MNI Coordinates 
 
Inference-making network 
 
L. RLPFC 10 -36 56 7 
L. DLPFC 9 -48 23 37 
L. IPL 40 -42 -58 52 
R. RLPFC 10 33 59 4 
R. DLPFC 9 42 17 46 
R. IPL 40 
 
48 
 
-55 
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ToM network 
 
     
L. TPJ 40 -50 -55 25 
R. TPJ 
mPFC 
PC 
       40 
9 
7 
50 
0 
-1 
-55 
55 
-56 
25 
6 
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L. = left; R. = right; ∼BA = approximate Brodmannʼs area. 
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Table 3. Analysis of effects for the Bayesian ANOVA with the effects Story version 
(Implicated-Premise versus Fully-Deductive), Network (Inference-making versus ToM) 
and Age. 
Effects  P(incl)  P(incl|data)       BF Inclusion  
Story version   0.737   1.000   2.957e +10   
Network   0.737   0.983   20.552   
Age   0.737   0.955   7.553   
Story version  ×  Network   0.316   0.948   39.833   
Story version  ×  Age   0.316   0.639   3.829   
Network ×  Age   0.316   0.914   22.923   
Story version  ×  Network ×  Age   0.053   0.218   5.005   
 
